In a nutshell
Hibbett is a rather solid company within the demonized sector of athletic footwear and apparel distribution.
This sector is under a huge reorganization, but Hibbett is expected to emerge reinforced from this process due to its differentiated business model, which provides a strong shield against disintermediation.
Hibbett’s business model, focused on underserved communities, provides great value to the big brands (Nike, Adidas, Under Armour…), that would find it difficult to replicate.
Besides, Hibbett is a profitable company, growing during the last 15 years, generating strong FCF, with no debt and improving its metrics.
Current valuation (3.8x EV/EBITDA or 4.3 x EV/EBIT) doesn’t appear to be in line with the reality of the company and seems to be the effect of the market treating the different companies within the sector alike (regardless of their specific situation).
If the company keeps executing, the market should finally recognize the higher value of this company and re-rate its valuation.
(it is recommended to read this post directly in Substack since it is too long for email and might be truncated)
Introduction
I usually center my articles on companies that are thriving (or about to thrive) and focus my analysis on the business model and its virtues. Indeed I do prefer and look for this kind of companies: growing companies with strong fundamentals and capacity to keep growing and reinvest in the business. The main reason to look for these companies is that they allow making the work just once: when you find one of these companies, you can buy and hold them “forever” (i.e. until the thesis changes).
This time is different. This is a pure-value play and in that sense my focus moves to the price. However, please, don’t misinterpret my words. Let me elaborate a little bit more. Hibbett, as we will see, is a solid company with still much room to grow. This is not a “cigar butt”. However, at the same time, it’s a mature company within a mature industry: athletic footwear and apparel distribution. I mean that here there will be no explosive growth expectations, or large expansions in the horizon, or triple-digit growth rates, or winner-takes-all dynamics… Moving the focus to the price means that I have the feeling that what is embedded in the price might be worse than what the reality of the company suggests and my hope is that the market, should the company keeps executing, will finally uncover the higher value of the company and revert the situation.
In that sense let’s start with a back-of-the-envelope, very-basic and static valuation:
The objective of this rough calculation is just to serve as starting point: looking at the most recent figures, we are in front of a company that apparently is being valued with really low multiples. The idea of this article is to try to understand why the market is giving this low valuation to Hibbett and if there could be specific issues pointing to a better direction and suggesting that perhaps the market’s feelings are too pessimistic. So don’t take this valuation as something cast in stone. It is just the trigger to start thinking about the company’s future and specifically about how to answer these specific questions:
Are there structural factors that suggest this company deserves this low valuation?
Are there circumstantial factors that might make this Q3 FY22 LTM results to be inflated and so it might be expected these results to revert to pre-pandemic levels?
Could there be other positive factors that might offset these structural or circumstantial factors and make the company to emerge stronger from this Covid period?
Let´s start with the first question and specifically with most relevant structural problem: the direct-to-consumer (DTC) strategy that the main athletic-sports brands are implementing.
Why is the market dismissing Hibbett (and other sports retailers)?
There is no doubt that the sector of sporting-goods pure-distributors is out of favor and considered under the sword of Damocles of being disintermediated by the big brands (like Nike, Adidas or Under Armour). Perhaps the inflection point for the sector (and specifically for Hibbett) was the launching in June 2017 of Nike’s Consumer Direct Offense (that has been recently reinforced with the Consumer Direct Acceleration in June 2020). This strategy, apart from different technological innovations, pursues to enhance direct connections with consumers and this has been interpreted by the market as a potential progressive disintermediation of its wholesale partners. Nike has expressed its intention of moving from doing business with 30,000 retailers to about 40 partners, which is a tectonic movement for the sector, but the market goes even further and seems to fear that this might be just a medium-term milestone, being the end-goal the total disintermediation of the sector.
Following the announcement of Nike’s strategy, other players (e.g. Adidas, Under Armour, Crocs) started to express also their intention of following similar approaches and this exacerbated even more the fear of disintermediation.
Is this Armageddon interpretation overblown?
The potential disintermediation of the sector is a very real issue. If finally these big brands decided to cut off its ties with their wholesale partners, this would suppose a really tough and structural problem, specifically in the case of companies like Hibbett with a huge dependency on few vendors.
But is the market reasonably calibrating this risk? Or perhaps it has gone too far? In order to explain why the market might have overblown this interpretation let’s focus on Nike, as it is the most relevant partner for Hibbett and the leader in the sector that usually paves the way for the other brands (though we would reach similar conclusions using any of the other big brands).
First of all, Nike has made clear since the launching of its new direct strategy and in several occasions that it will continue working with its strategic partners (i.e. differentiated wholesale partners “who share the vision to create a consistent, connected and modern shopping experience”) and “continue to intentionally right size undifferentiated dimensions of the marketplace”.
In almost every conference call Nike clearly states the importance of these strategic partners and how this new strategy could positively affect them. Let’s have a look to some specific examples (emphasis added):
Fiscal 2022 Q2 Nike’s conf call: “As we’ve discussed before, Nike is focused on creating One Nike Marketplace that elevates the Brand by creating direct consumer connections through fewer, more impactful wholesale partners, with a connected mobile digital experience at the center built for the Nike member”.
Fiscal 2022 Q1 Nike’s conf call: “In terms of undifferentiated or differentiated, what I would tell you is that we continue to see strong growth in our differentiated partners”.
Fiscal 2021 Q4 Nike’s conf call: “As part of our overall One Nike Marketplace, we are also actively engaged with our strategic wholesale partners who share our vision (…) We will continue reshaping our wholesale business portfolio, which includes divesting from undifferentiated retail while investing in our strategic wholesale partners for healthy growth”.
Fiscal 2021 Q2 Nike’s conf call: “As we look forward, we are going to be more aggressive with larger, undifferentiated customers that we have been working with and we're working closely with our strategic wholesale partners in a city-by-city, mall-by-mall, street-by-street basis to work together to determine how we're going to recapture that demand”.
2020 Nike’s Annual Shareholders meeting: “So, here's our commitment: Nike will provide our consumers with the most premium and the most seamless experience of any retailer, and our strategy to meet that commitment is focused on Nike being more digital, more direct, and more differentiated. We will do that through our own channels as well as with select key partners who share that same commitment”.
Fiscal 2020 Q4 Nike’s conf call: “Our One Nike marketplace strategy leads with NIKE Digital in our own stores and embraces a small number of strategic partners who share our vision to provide a consistent premium shopping experience”.
Nike’s strategy looks for the creation and enhancement of more direct consumer relationships, moving even closer to the consumer through digital innovation and owned stores, but it is currently far from the complete disintermediation of the sector. Indeed, Nike has clearly stated that the disintermediation will affect to its “undifferentiated” partners and that it is committed with all those strategic partners who share its vision and help in the creation of seamless premium experiences for its consumers (and Hibbett seems to be included in this group, as for the factors that will be exposed later).
What about the numbers?
Nike is clearly expressing its support to its strategic partners through public communications but maybe the numbers might be showing a different reality.
Should we look at Nike DTC’s share of revenue, it is pretty clear that its relevance has been steadily increasing (as it’s the situation for the other big brands), even before the launching of Nike’s direct strategy in 2017:
There is no doubt that Nike has been trying to boost the part of its business coming from DTC. However, this doesn’t mean necessarily that the wholesale business has decreased in dollar terms and indeed it is the opposite:
As it can be observed in the chart, since 2017 Nike Brand’s wholesale business has grown more than 12%. So clearly DTC revenues are booming in Nike, but the company isn’t doing that at the expense of the wholesale business. This reinforces the message that Nike has been repeating in its public communications: nowadays there is no intention to cut off its strategic partners and indeed the wholesale business keeps growing.
Why can we consider Hibbett Sports as a relevant partner to Nike’s strategy?
Nike has made clear that it will continue working just with its strategic partners so the key is to understand why Hibbett should be considered as part of this group. In that sense, there is one structural characteristic that makes Hibbett unique and a really valuable partner: its focus on underserved communities.
During its last Investors Day (June 2021), Hibbett presented this interesting slide:
The idea of this slide was basically to show the limited competition that Hibbett’s stores face, with 70% of its stores having 2 or less competitors “within a 15 minute drive from each store location”.
Delving into this topic, in the last conference call (Q3 FY22) they went even further: from January 2022 on (date when many Nike’s partners will stop receiving Nike stuff), 50% of the stores will have “no competition within 3 miles” and “if you expand that and look at the stores with 1 or less competitors within 3 miles, that figure increases to almost 70%”. Besides, looking specifically to Nike’s stores, it can be observed that they are even much further away from Hibbett’s stores.
Nike has stated that its intention, within its Consumer Direct Acceleration strategy, is “opening somewhere between 150 and 200 new stores (…) in North America and EMEA” (Q4 2020 Nike’s conf call). However, almost since the start of its Consumer Direct Offense (2017) the reality is that the company has been steadily reducing its store count:
Additionally, if we analyze the recent evolution of Nike’s stores it doesn’t seem to pursue a direct competition with Hibbett’s business areas, as most of Nike’s new stores are being opened in urban/metropolitan areas (e.g. Portland, New York, San Antonio, Atlanta).
Therefore Hibbett provides a complementary geographical footprint to Nike and access to a huge network of stores focused on underserved communities. This lack of overlapping between Nike’s and Hibbett’s footprint, and the access to and contact with a different customer base that the latter gives the former, makes Hibbett a valuable partner for Nike (and the other big brands) and invites to think that it won’t be cut off in the near future.
The increasing importance of Hibbett to Nike (and vice versa).
After looking at the importance of Hibbett to Nike from a qualitative perspective, let’s also have a look at the numbers again:
There is no doubt about the importance that Nike represents for Hibbett’s business. However, it is also relevant to highlight that Hibbett is also an important customer for Nike and that both companies have been strengthening their ties in recent years. There exist larger partners for Nike (e.g. Foot Locker, Dick’s, JD Sports) but Hibbett cannot be considered a negligible one at all (one of the five Nike key accounts in the US), and, in that sense, the decision of getting rid of this business is not trivial for Nike.
Besides, maybe it is more telling to observe how this relationship has been evolving: the importance of Nike for the company has been progressively increasing and currently represents a huge part of Hibbett’s merchandise purchases (65%). Indeed, if we look at the recent evolution of one of those partners that will no longer receive Nike’s merchandise, as it is the case of Big 5 Sporting Goods ($BGFV), we can see a very different pattern:
We can observe how Big 5 Sporting Goods’ relationship with Nike was gradually declining since 2017 and finally Nike decided to cut off its ties with the company in March 2021.
So all in all, from a quantitative perspective, again there are no specific hints that invite to think that Hibbett will be disintermediated in the near future.
The combined impact of a lower number of distributors and higher wholesale business is expected to be accretive to the select group of Nike’s strategic partners.
As it has been already mentioned, Nike expressed its intention of moving from doing business with 30,000 retailers to about 40 partners. This is a terrifying situation for Nike’s distributors unless you are part of this select group of strategic partners and this seems to be the case of Hibbett, as it has been explained above. For these remaining strategic partners, the huge simplification of Nike’s partnerships will probably create some sort of oligopolistic environment, where all the business that previously flowed through the “undifferentiated” partners will be distributed through them (together with Nike direct channels).
This positive effect has been also repeatedly commented by Nike in its conference calls. Let´s have a look again to some of these specific comments (emphasis added):
Fiscal 2022 Q2 Nike’s conf call: “Over the past four years, North America has reduced the number of wholesale accounts by roughly 50 percent, while delivering strong growth and recapturing consumer demand through Nike Direct and our strategic wholesale partners”.
Fiscal 2021 Q3 Nike’s conf call: “And so as we segment it, it's we're leaning in with those partners that see the world the same way we do, and those are the ones and the good news is they do, and the good news is those are the partners that have the most robust business with our shared consumers today. So, the consolidation will continue. And again, I think you'll see even more movement from undifferentiated retail into a smaller number of partners and our own stores to provide that seamless premium experience”.
Fiscal 2021 Q2 conf call: “Within wholesale, we continue to shift the marketplace towards differentiated retail and to give you some context of our progress leading up to the pandemic, over the last three-years we have reduced the number of undifferentiated accounts in North America by roughly 30% while still delivering mid-single-digit growth on average, and in Q2, as we manage product supply in response to the pandemic, we took further steps towards account and channel consolidation by reprioritizing product allocation to benefit our strategic partners and NIKE Direct” (…) “As we look forward, we're going to be more aggressive in adjusting our plans with undifferentiated wholesale, but what I would tell you is that we believe that we, and our partners, are very well-positioned to capture demand that gets dislocated from changing the profile and the shape of the marketplace”.
Fiscal 2021 Q1 conf call: “The result was high-single-digit growth in differentiated wholesale offset by a decline of over 20% in undifferentiated wholesale, all with a higher full-price realization versus the prior year. This is a trend that we expect to continue throughout this fiscal year as we change the shape of the North America marketplace”.
Fiscal 2020 Q4 conf call: “And embracing the great wholesale partners that we think will be the real winners along with us and partnering as close as we can with them to build that marketplace of the future”.
This positive impact can be observed in the reinforcement of Hibbett’s and Nike’s common ties, as it was stated in the previous point: Hibbett’s business with Nike has been steadily increasing since the launching of Nike’s direct strategy. But this is not exclusively the case of Hibbett. Should we look to other strategic partners, as it is for instance the case of Foot Locker ($FL), the situation is rather similar:
In summary, this disintermediation risk cannot be underestimated and should be closely monitored. However, in the case of Hibbett, there are currently no hints of a near-term disintermediation. Its business model is perfectly complementary with the big brands and for them to replicate Hibbett’s model would be rather costly. Indeed, as the restructuring of the sector moves forward, it is reasonable to think that those strategic partners that remain doing business with Nike (and the other big brands) will probably enhance its performance and that Hibbett specifically will probably be able to take advantage of the situation and increase its market share.
Additional positive points
This disintermediation problem is the most relevant aspect to understand why Hibbett is so undervalued and why the market is probably excessively penalizing the company. However, once this issue has been analyzed, there are many other aspects that can help to understand why Hibbett might be considered as a solid company or at least a much better company than what the market thinks:
Hibbett has a long story of increasing revenues.
Hibbett has been able to steadily increase its revenue during more than 15 years and even during the Great Financial Crisis:
Besides, the company projects to keep growing, with the objective of achieving $2bn by FY25, as stated within its financial targets for the next 3 years.
Hibbett has been recently improving its productivity.
Hibbett decided to start in 2019 the Store Closure Plan, a strategic realignment plan aimed at improving the productivity of the store base and at closing underperforming stores. Thanks to these actions the company has recently been able to improve its productivity (even before the start of the pandemic), progressively increasing its sales per average gross square foot:
The Company closed 232 stores between FY19 and FY21, focused on “those stores (that) are typically about half the volume of a typical Hibbett store”.
Hibbett is finally restarting its fleet growth.
As commented in the previous point, Hibbett carried out its Store Closure Plan between FY19 and FY21 with the closure of many poor-performing stores:
However, after the finalization of this Plan, the Company has resumed its fleet growth and indeed is projecting “net low double digit unit store growth per brand”.
Hibbett has been improving its Comparable Store Sales quarter by quarter.
After many years of disappointing Comparable Store Sales, Hibbett started to turn around this negative tendency in FY19:
Indeed the company has been able to achieve positive comp sales in 13 of the last 16 quarters.
Hibbett generates strong FCF and presents a healthy financial position.
The principal source of Hibbett’s liquidity is the cash flows provided by its operations (with no outstanding debt by the end of Q3 FY22):
This chart depicts the evolution of FCF and FCF before Working Capital changes and Stock Based Compensation. This second measure is a smoother cash flow metric that eliminates quarterly jumps in current assets/liabilities, being more stable in the long run.
In any case, whatever the FCF metric, it is clear that Hibbett has been able to steadily generate positive FCF and has been clearly improving its cash generation during the last years. It is true that it is still early to see what will be the impact of eliminating the disruptions caused by the COVID pandemic and all the stimuli provided during this period, but Hibbett’s growth trajectory invites to be optimistic.
Besides, current capex levels (aprox. $70m expected in FY22) are well above run rate levels ($25m) as the company has carried out a relevant effort in terms of investments in order to accelerate its plans in store development and IT projects. However, this capex amount almost tripled its run rate levels, so it is expected to be lower in the future, positively affecting FCF generation.
Hibbett promotes a shareholders-friendly capital allocation.
Hibbett’s capital strategy looks for firstly allocate operating cash flows into the business (growth and maintenance capex) and the rest is mainly devoted to share repurchases (and some to dividends). Since 2014 the Company has almost halved its shares number:
On May 2021 the company authorized the expansion of the existing Stock Repurchase Program by $500m to a total of $800m (until FY25), of which there are still remaining approximately $398m (almost 50% of current Hibbett’s market cap!).
There has been recently some insider buying.
Other than purchases from 2 Directors and the General Counsel, maybe the most relevant purchases came from Hibbett’s CEO Mick Longo, who acquired in October 2021 $350k in stocks.
Besides James Khezrie, the owner and CEO of Jimmy Jazz, a private competitor of Hibbett, unveiled a recently-acquired position in Hibbett of 5.34% (800,000+ shares), with an weighted average price of $75 for the last 200k shares acquired. This position has been reduced later a little bit (to 4.5%) but it is still a relevant position and rather telling coming from a direct competitor.
Some negative points
Hibbett doesn’t look like it will be disintermediated in the near future, but this doesn’t mean this risk has disappeared.
As previously commented, in the specific case of Hibbett, there are currently no hints of a near-term disintermediation. Its business model is perfectly complementary with those of the big brands and for them to replicate Hibbett’s model would be rather burdensome. Indeed, as the restructuring of the sector moves forward, Hibbett will probably be able to take advantage of the situation.
Having said that, this potential disintermediation is for sure the main risk Hibbett faces (as it is the case for the whole sector of sporting-goods pure-distributors) and shouldn’t be underestimated. Regardless of the lack of disintermediation signs, it is unclear how the sector will evolve and when this partners’ rationalization will finalize. Besides, this entire situation might make the market to take a long time to be convinced about the strength of this company.
Hibbett’s profitability metrics has been deteriorating during the last years just before the pandemic period and is still pending to underpin and demonstrate its turnaround.
Being true that Hibbett has been able to increase its revenue during more than 15 years, it is also true that during the last years its profitability indicators were deteriorating:
This deterioration was due to a confluence of different factors: increased promotional markdowns, the progressive introduction of e-commerce sales (with lower margins), costs related with the store restructuring plan, the integration of City Gear (acquired in 2018), deleverage associated with lower comparable store sales, etc. Some of these factors are expected to disappear in the future, as it is the case of the City Gear’s integration or the store restructuring plan, that can be considered completed; or at least to lower its negative impact, as for instance in the case of the e-commerce sales, that are expected to improve its margin contribution as the company improves its fulfillment processes, or the comparable store sales, that has been clearly improving during the last years. However, it is still pending to know how the company will emerge from this Covid period, which might have somewhat distorted the real situation of Hibbett (see next point).
Hibbett might face some pressure due to the finalization of several short-term pandemic tailwinds.
Since the start of the pandemic Hibbett’s margins started to improve and are nowadays in really good shape:
However it is important to understand that there have been some factors that positively impacted the company during the pandemic period and that no longer exist or won’t exist in the future. These are factors like stimuli, pent-up demand, favorable promotional environment or lean towards goods vs services/experiences expenditures. All these factors have had a relevant impact in both Hibbett’s revenues and margins, and it is unclear what could be the impact of their finalization. It is true that there might be many aspects that could offset the impact once all these factors disappear, but there is no doubt that there will be some negative pressure.
Hibbett is still suffering some of the pandemic headwinds.
As it is the case of many companies, within and outside this sector, Hibbett is still suffering some of the negative effects that have emerged during this pandemic situation: inflation pressures, higher labor costs, labor shortage, supply chain disruptions, lack of inventory, etc. All these factors are expected to be fixed in the near-to-medium term, but there is still lot of uncertainty around them.
Let’s go back to the initial questions and the “rough” valuation
After making this (maybe too long) review of the main points affecting Hibbett’s valuation, let’s try to briefly answer the initial questions:
Are there structural factors that suggest this company deserves this low valuation?
The main structural problem for Hibbett is the potential disintermediation of the sector and there is no doubt that this is a real problem that deserves continuous monitoring. However, nowadays there are no specific signs of near-term disintermediation and indeed it seems that Hibbett and Nike are reinforcing its relationship. Hibbett’s business model is rather complementary with respect to Nike’s (and the other big brands) so it doesn’t seem reasonable to think that the big brands will get rid of this relationship in the near future.
Are there circumstantial factors that might make this Q3 FY22 LTM results to be inflated and so it might be expected these results to revert to pre-pandemic levels?
As noted in the part related to the negative points, Hibbett has clearly benefited from some recent positive aspects that won’t help the results in the future (e.g. stimuli, pent-up demand or low-promotional environment) and so there might be some pressure coming from the finalization of all of these “Covid tailwinds”.
However there are other positive dynamics (see next question) that might make the results to keep improving or at least not to revert to pre-pandemic levels.
Could there be other positive factors that might offset these structural or circumstantial factors and make the company to emerge from stronger this Covid period?
Absolutely, as it has been clearly stated, there are many factors that invites to be optimistic: Hibbett might be one of the most benefited companies from this sectorial restructuring process, gaining business and market share; it is expected to keep reaping the benefits of its store rationalization process; it will probably keep expanding, once it has resumed the growth of its store count (and with much room for growth); it will probably improve its margins after the acceleration of its investment plan (and will reduce its capital expenditures)… There are many reasons to think that the company might emerge from the pandemic period rather strong.
Let’s now come back to the initial valuation:
Taking into account what has been mentioned all across this article, let´s think about some hypothetical scenarios to see what could be an EBITDA and EBIT normalized levels and how these different inputs would affect the valuation. Again, these are just rough and static valuations (almost all of them assuming no growth) that serve to think about the situation of the company (not rocket science):
Scenario 1 includes no changes in revenue, as it assumes that all the positive aspects mentioned within this article would offset the finalization of “Covid tailwinds”. However, it also assumes some margin compression (370bps to 35%) due to a less favorable environment (i.e. more promotional environment and reduced supply-demand imbalance) that cannot be completely neutralize by all the factors that are expected to help compensate those margin pressures. This might be considered a rather realistic scenario in terms of margins and in line with the FY22 outlook provided in the last results presentation (though maybe a little bit conservative in terms of revenues).
Scenario 2 is more stretched and assumes that margins would revert to pre-pandemic levels. This scenario considers that all the positive margin-compensatory effects will not prevent the margins to go back to pre-pandemic levels.
Scenario 3 shows a much more pessimistic hypothesis, combining the effect of a 10% decrease in revenues (keeping SG&A and depreciation and amortization expenses unchanged) with gross margins returning to pre-pandemic levels. This is nowadays a rather unexpected scenario (think that in the last 15 years the company has only had one year of negative growth and it was -0.5%).
Scenario 4 reflects an optimistic scenario, assuming the company reaching FY25 targets of $2bn in revenues and gross margin expansion (though increasing SG&A and depreciation and amortization expenses proportionally).
All in all these basic valuations serve to show that using more normalized figures (scenario 1) or even more stretched hypothesis (scenarios 2 and 3) this is a company that, taking into account its relative strength and solid financial situation, seems to present rather low multiples. Should we look at the scenario 4, which might be rather achievable in the next 3 years (at least in terms of revenues), the company might be considered a complete bargain.
And what about its peers’ valuation? Within the athletic footwear and apparel industry there are many companies to compare with, but probably these following companies might be considered Hibbett’s main peers among the public ones:
Foot Locker, Inc. ($FL)
Dick's Sporting Goods, Inc. ($DKS)
Big 5 Sporting Goods Corporation ($BGFV)
Sportsman's Warehouse Holdings, Inc. ($SPWH)
Let’s have a look at some valuation multiples for these companies in order to have a broader perspective:
As it can be observed, all the companies within the sector present rather similar valuations. This reinforces the idea that the market is not discriminating and gives a similar low multiple to all the companies within the sector, considering that all of them might be subject of disruption. Indeed it is rather telling that the market gives a similar valuation to $BGFV, a company that has been already “disintermediated” by Nike, than to the other companies that are still considered strategic partners. The problem with this situation of market myopia is that it can last longer than expected and the market to remain as such many time. However, in the end, if the company keeps executing and being relevant to the big brands, the market will finally recognize its value.
Conclusion
Hibbett is a rather solid company within a defenestrated sector. This athletic footwear and apparel distribution industry is under the sword of Damocles of being disintermediated by the big brands (like Nike, Adidas or Under Armour) and the market makes no discrimination among the different players. In that sense, Hibbett’s valuation is rather in line with its peers, but it’s probably in a much better situation than most of them.
Hibbett has a differentiated business model that is highly complementary to the big brands and it’s not expected to be disintermediated by them in the near future. Indeed it is expected, as the reorganization of the sector goes forward, the company to reinforce its position and gain additional business and market share.
There are still some uncertainties about how the company will emerge from this pandemic period (as it is the case of each and every retail company) but there are many positive signs that invite to be optimistic and there is no doubt that, if the company keeps executing, we should see a re-rating of this company in the future.
Hibbett Sports ($HIBB): a pure-value play
Any thoughts on today’s earnings release?